[Westheim]

Nick Valdes was so disappointed about the CLCS exit that he didn’t show up in person, or even call after the season ended. He had his assistant Yozef call instead and wave through another $2M budget increase, which lifted the Raccoons from $58M to $60M to blow – still below the 2049 budget, though, which came off five straight pennants. This one came off zero straight pennants, as I was painfully aware of.

Despite the additional dosh, the Coons slid one spot in the budget rankings, from 8th to 9th for the new season.

Top 5: Thunder ($72M), Knights ($69M), Capitals ($69M), Crusaders ($65M), Gold Sox ($64M)
Bottom 5: Indians ($43.5M), Condors ($42.5M), Loggers ($41.5M), Wolves ($39.5M), Aces ($30.5M)

The Miners slid from 2nd place and $70M to $62M and a tie for sixth place. That tie was with the damn Elks, who sagged from ranking 3rd last year.

The bottom five were the same as last season, although the Condors and Indians traded places. Also, the Aces were obviously trying to win the championship with nothing but minimum salary players.

Finally, the Titans ranked 14th with a $49M budget. That covered all the CL North teams.

The average budget for a team in the league rose to $53.4M, up almost exactly $1M from last season, while the median team budget was $52M, up $1.75M from last season.

+++

Four players had options for the 2056 season, some player and some team options. First, the two in which the Coons would not have a say split themselves down the middle. Danny Munn picked up his $5.9M option for next season, while Kevin Hitchcock said nah to his $1.5M option, which was probably smart because he’d probably get more on the market. And the Coons would have to bid along because righty relief right now was a sore on this team.

So was pitching in general, but first let’s look at the team options. Seisaku Taki had gotten progressively “worse” (more like: less splendid) over his four years with the team, including a (hard-luck) 9-9 campaign with a 3.91 ERA this season, but there was no reason why we wouldn’t pick up his $3M option for the 2056 season. In fact it would be hard to find a finer pitcher for that money. And while the basic numbers for his ’55 season weren’t great, and first innings especially, he had posted career-best marks in BB/9 and K/9. He was also only 28 years old – you wouldn’t put that on the street willy-nilly.

The other team option was the second and final $1.98M option on the 10-year deal that Matt Waters had signed a good old time ago. He had recovered somewhat offensively in the second half after a year and a half that were rather dire. He’d be 35 years old, but so far his defense was still alright. Whether we wanted more of him at second base after his age 35 season… probably not, but let him swing the stick first. If he hit 28 dingers again as he did in 2053, I might get stupid enough to sign him again.

After that we still had four more free agents (in addition to Kevin Hitchcock) and six arbitration cases to talk about and there’d be some head scratchers in there. [Full pre-fiddling arbitration table at the bottom, as usual]

The free agents included Chris Gowin, who had been a riot in 2054, and rather mediocre in 2055, and was a type-B free agent. While his stick had amounted to only a 97 OPS+, he was still well above average defensively, so I was at least tempted to forego the draft pick and make an offer.

Ed Crispin had served loyally as a backup third baseman for two partial and five full seasons, batting precisely league average for his career with a 100 OPS+, although the individual seasons were quite up and down. He had never qualified with 502 PA, but had come as close as 404, and in his full seasons had gone with fewer than 327 PA only twice. He was also still relatively young (almost 29), and was a nice lefty stick to have around. His calamity was the lack of a second position, but he just lacked the range for the middle infield. So technically we’d like to keep him, but he was also a bit of a tall order for a roster spot on a team that still tried to figure out what to do with Kyle Brobeck as a whole.

The other two free agents were outfielders Ricky Lamotta and Jason Monson. The latter had sucked the cover off the baseballs on his third team in six months, and Lamotta was still laboring on his concussion that had ended his season in July. They were hardly world beaters, but Lamotta should at least be cheap as a backup if our heart so desired.

Arbitration then. No-brainers for lefty relievers on the list: Lillis and Sencion were very good and both would be in a contract year in 2056. Then there was backup catcher Tyler Philipps, who was never hitting much, and despite offering good D and the ability to play first base, was on the list for an upgrade. The Coons had a high-ranking catching prospect in Marcos Chavez, but he had only reached AAA in the September Shuffles and was not expected to contribute in a meaningful way next year.

Further on the arbitration front we had Harry Ramsay, who had been hurt and failing in the first half, and had then rallied to hit .312 overall in the second half. Only five homers for the year, though, plus four more in AAA, where he was stowed for 43 games while we were briefly disappointed by Pedro Rojas. New contract, sure, but we wouldn’t buy in for seven years right now.

Since we’re on it – do you remember who wanted a 7-year deal last season? Raffy. (sharply draws in air between his teeth)

In 2052, Raffy pitched to a 11-12 record with a 3.32 ERA in a full season of 33 starts for the Portlanders. Too many walks even then, but he only turned 22 during that season, so there was every reason to expect him to get better.

Since that 2052 season, in three years, Raffy had made just 43 starts, going 14-12 with a 3.54 ERA (rising though). In ’55, he had pitched under five innings per start. He was walking more and whiffing fewer than ever before. And the real knack was the injuries of course, because he wasn’t making 14 starts a year for being too pretty to send out in the rain. He was more too much made out of sugar. Tommy John, a shoulder strain, and now shoulder inflammation. Since the end of May 2053, he had piled up 21 months of injury time (including his expected return to throwing in February or March), well over half the time. His newest scouting report was mildly grotesque, and Luis Silva was running out snake oils to treat him with. That wasn’t to say that we’d not throw a million into the fire to keep him in the organization, but you’d be well advised to not expect any miracles.

And then, Brobeck. The SP/3B was barely hanging on as a pitcher, going 9-8 with a 4.41 ERA in 32 games (27 starts), walking almost as many as he whiffed. Right now he was being kept around more for novelty reasons and that he was two players in one roster slot, since he was also hitting .294/.359/.431 for a 119 OPS+ in 170 PA. For his career, he was even hitting for a 128 OPS+. He was a switch-hitter, but better against right-handers, so he wasn’t mixing well with Crispin to begin with.

The real question was whether the Coons wanted him to continue starting, and whether we could afford to not do it.

Because the crippling injuries to Raffy and Kennedy Adkins left the Raccoons markedly short in the starting department as the offseason began. Adkins would miss most of the season, and whether Raffy would actually be pieced together in time for the new season was a thing of its own. Well, you saw what we ran out for a playoff rotation, and how it got schnitzeled by the Knights. Good for them – they had waited for a ring long enough – but I was concerned about even breaking .500 right now…!

Even with a $60M budget we were not exactly drowning in dosh to sign replacements, since $17M were already earmarked for Danny Munn, Anton Venegas, and Kennedy Adkins, who’d be on the DL for most of his $5.3M next year. By the way, Anton Venegas was on the roster for the entire second half, but I can’t remember a single memorable at-bat after he missed June with a hammy. He hit .167 in September/October, and .222 in the abortive CLCS. You couldn’t expect any takers for that on the trade market and he, too, had a player option for 2057.

Another $11M and change were tied up for He Shui, Seisaku Taki (aka Our Rotation), Pucks, Waters, and Lonzo. So we were spending $28M and the odd dime over that on eight players, seven of whom were available, and had no bright young pitching to fill the numerous holes.

Cameron Argenziano had pitched to a 7-1 mark and 2.59 ERA through September 16, then went on to throw 11.1 innings for 16 earned runs in his final two regular season starts and Game 3 in the CLCS (and the Coons somehow won that one…). There had been reasons indeed why he had lingered in AAA as a 27-year-old. Even when he had produced superficially nice results in August and September, he had rarely produced Game Scores better than 60. He was not a starting pitcher on a team with ambitions, in April especially.

Craig Kniep hadn’t lost a game between his five starts in September, but had walked 6.3/9 regardless. Control was getting better for him, and he was a leading candidate for a spot in the rotation despite the flaws. Right-handed relief looked even worse. Hitchcock was a free agent, the Asian Brigade had been dismal in the last few months and the playoffs, and then you arrived at the Ryan Harmers and Colby Bowens already.

So, the Coons had major construction sites in the rotation, bullpen, catching, and the outfield. Whether the infield needed a rehash depended a lot on your opinion of Ramsay, and Waters was perhaps in his final year.

At least we got Lonzo! Lonzo and the three lefty relievers would get this team far…!